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CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
BY 
LISA HEINZERLING* 
In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Supreme Court confronted the issue of climate change for the first 
time. The Court held that the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental 
Protection Agency the authority to regulate greenhouse gases and that 
the agency may not decline to exercise this authority based either on 
factors not present in the statute or on inconclusive gestures toward 
uncertainty in the science of climate change. I had the privilege of 
serving as the lead author of the winning briefs in this case. This Article 
provides an insider’s perspective on the choices that went into bringing 
and briefing the case. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
In 1999, a group of non-governmental organizations, led by the 
International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA), petitioned the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases from 
new motor vehicles.1 Section 202 of the Clean Air Act provides that EPA 
“shall” regulate air pollutants from new motor vehicles when those 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is an edited version of 
the 20th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute Distinguished Lecture, delivered on October 3, 
2007 at Lewis and Clark Law School. 
 1 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (Massachusetts v. EPA), 127 S. Ct. 
1438, 1449 (2007). 
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pollutants “may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”2 Relying on scientific evidence of the likelihood of and probable 
harms from climate change, ICTA and the other petitioners argued that the 
EPA was required to regulate because greenhouse gases may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.3 
Four years later, EPA finally came back with an answer.4 Its answer 
was, in short, “no.” First, the agency concluded that it did not have the 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.5 EPA 
reasoned that Congress had enacted a number of laws relating to climate 
change, but none of these laws had explicitly required regulation of 
greenhouse gases.6 Congress had, moreover, declined to pass bills that 
would have required regulation of greenhouse gases, thus showing, in EPA’s 
view, a lack of desire to allow such regulation.7 And, EPA said, greenhouse 
gas regulation does not fit with other statutory programs, such as the fuel 
economy program of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.8 Therefore, 
EPA concluded, greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” under the Clean 
Air Act because evidence from outside the statutory text indicated a 
Congressional desire to refrain from regulating.9 
Second, EPA stated that even if it did have authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases, it would not exercise this authority.10 EPA explained, in 
essence, that it did not really like the statute all that much; under a heading 
entitled “different policy approach,”11 EPA discussed its preference for 
voluntary measures rather than the “inefficient” and “piecemeal” approach 
of section 202 of the Clean Air Act.12 The agency also expressed concern that 
there might not be technology reasonably available to control greenhouse 
gases from motor vehicles,13 and that “unilateral” EPA action on climate 
change could imperil negotiations with developing countries over 
greenhouse gas reductions.14 Finally, EPA provided a long list of unresolved 
scientific issues surrounding the problem of climate change.15 
Several of the organizations that had initially asked EPA to regulate 
were now joined in a legal challenge to EPA’s decision by a large group of 
states, several cities, an American territory, and numerous environmental 
and public health organizations.16 They asked the D.C. Circuit to reverse 
 
 2 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q, § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
 3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449. 
 4 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (Sept. 
8, 2003). 
 5 Id. at 52925–29. 
 6 Id. at 52926, 52927–28. 
 7 Id. at 52927. 
 8 Id. at 52929. 
 9 Id. at 52928. 
 10 Id. at 52929–31. 
 11 Id. at 52929. 
 12 Id. at 52930, 52931. 
 13 Id. at 52931. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 52930–31. 
 16 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
GAL.HEINZERLING.DOC 2/1/2008  3:34:54 PM 
2008] CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SUPREME COURT 3 
EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases. In a splintered decision, 
the court sided with EPA.17 Judge Randolph concluded that EPA had the 
discretion to decline to regulate greenhouse gases even if it had the 
authority to do so;18 Judge Sentelle argued that petitioners had no standing 
to bring a court action based on so generalized a problem as climate 
change;19 and Judge Tatel sided with petitioners on every issue.20 
Unfortunately, Judge Tatel was alone and in dissent.21 
In the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens wrote for a 5-4 majority.22 He 
concluded that petitioners had standing to sue,23 that EPA clearly has the 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants under the Clean Air 
Act,24 and that EPA’s conclusion that it could decline to regulate even if it 
had the authority was arbitrary and capricious.25 
Writing for four Justices in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that petitioners here had no standing and broadly hinted there is no 
standing, ever, in climate change litigation.26 Justice Scalia also filed a 
dissent, on behalf of the same bloc of justices.27 On authority, he concluded 
that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” because they are not dirty and 
that the atmosphere is not “air.”28 On discretion, he argued that EPA was 
within its rights to decide that it was not yet time to decide whether to 
regulate greenhouse gases.29 
The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA has already begun to 
have large-scale ramifications. A district court has upheld Vermont’s law 
adopting California’s program regulating greenhouse gas emissions from 
cars partly on the strength of the Supreme Court’s decision;30 the 
environmental commissioner in Kansas has denied a permit for a coal-fired 
power plant, citing Massachusetts v. EPA;31 and the legal reasoning behind 
EPA’s decision not to control greenhouse gas emissions in setting New 
Source Performance Standards for power plants has been upended by the 
Court’s decision.32 
 
 17 Id. at 58–59, 61. 
 18 Id. at 56–59. 
 19 Id. at 59–60. 
 20 Id. at 61–82. 
 21 Id. at 53. 
 22 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 23 Id. at 1452–58. 
 24 Id. at 1459–62. 
 25 Id. at 1462–63. 
 26 Id. at 1463–71. 
 27 Id. at 1471. 
 28 Id. at 1475–78. 
 29 Id. at 1471–75. 
 30 See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, No. 2:05-cv-302, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67617, at *123–41 (D.Vt. Sept. 12, 2007). 
 31 KDHE Denies Sunflower Electric Air Quality Permit, KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, Oct. 
18, 2007, available at http://www.kdheks.gov/news/web_archives/2007/10182007a.htm. 
 32 Order for Standards for Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 98666, 98698 (Feb. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 60) (declining to regulate 
greenhouse gases from power plants because “EPA has concluded that it does not presently 
have the authority to set NSPS to regulate CO2 or other greenhouse gases that contribute to 
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How did we get here? The remainder of this Article discusses, from a 
lawyer’s perspective, the strategic and tactical decisions behind the 
Massachusetts v. EPA litigation. 
II. INSIDE MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA 
In this discussion, I walk through the choices that the lawyers for 
petitioners made, ranging from the decision to petition EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles to decisions about the precise 
wording of the briefs in the Supreme Court. In some instances, it is clear that 
the choices we made at least did not hurt our case, since we ultimately won. 
It is more difficult to say, of course, that the outcome would have been 
different if we had made different choices. Nevertheless, future litigants may 
find it helpful to understand the sheer breadth and subtle content of choices 
that shape litigation of this kind. 
Beginnings. Here we must go back to the late 1990s. At that time, 
scientists were sounding ever scarier alarms about the reality and 
consequences of climate change.33 Yet, on the international front, the Senate 
had formally expressed its opposition to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in its 
existing form.34 Thus nongovernmental organizations and governments other 
than the federal government (such as states and local governments) were 
casting about for legal theories under which domestic regulation of 
greenhouse gases could be jump-started. Everyone had a different theory. 
One idea was to begin by building cases under the National Environmental 
Policy Act, convincing agencies (through court order if necessary) to 
consider the climate-change consequences of their major activities.35 
Another idea was to start by persuading California to use its special 
authority under the Clean Air Act to set standards for new motor vehicles.36 
Yet another idea (my own, supported by no one but myself) was to petition 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases as “hazardous air pollutants” under 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act.37 The advantage of this approach was that 
section 112 had a clear petitioning procedure and set out deadlines within 
which the agency was required to answer petitions.38 The disadvantage was 
that section 112 seemed an awkward source for greenhouse gas regulation 
because it had historically been applied to pollutants that are directly 
hazardous to human health, such as carcinogens and neurotoxins.39 A 
 
global climate change”). 
 33 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1448–49 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (1996)). 
 34 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 35 For an outgrowth of this strategy, see Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 
889 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2005). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(A) (2005). 
 38 Id. 
 39 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing 
section 112 standard for vinyl chloride, a carcinogen). 
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different approach, adopted by Massachusetts, was to sue the EPA to require 
it to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for greenhouse gases40 
(Massachusetts eventually withdrew this lawsuit).41 Another possible 
approach was to petition EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles. 
The last approach was, of course, the one taken by ICTA and the other 
groups that filed the original petition with EPA that ultimately led to the 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. It is worth noting that these original 
petitioners included many small and, I must say, rather obscure 
nongovernmental organizations, but few large ones; Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth were the two best-known environmental organizations in the 
original group.42 The largest and most established environmental 
organizations did not join the initial petition. Nevertheless, Joe Mendelson, a 
senior staff attorney at ICTA, forged ahead and filed the petition that 
changed the legal landscape for climate change in the United States.43 
Petitioning the Court. Challenging EPA’s decision in the D.C. Circuit 
was not a big gamble. On the merits, petitioners were unlikely to end up with 
a result worse than the one they already had: that is, that the Clean Air Act 
provided no authority to regulate greenhouse gases and that even if it did, 
EPA would not be required to meaningfully investigate the relationship 
between climate change and public health and welfare. On the issue of 
standing—a sticking point in many environmental cases these days—even a 
loss in the D.C. Circuit would not have national consequences. 
Once the D.C. Circuit had issued its decision against petitioners, 
however, it became a substantial question whether to let the case end at that 
point. For one thing, the case was in an unfavorable posture for Court 
review. The fractured decision of the D.C. Circuit left no clear ruling to 
appeal. Of particular importance, the D.C. Circuit had issued no decision on 
the marquee issue in the case, that is, whether the Clear Air Act gives EPA 
the power to regulate greenhouse gases.44 Thus, the case did not appear to 
be a promising candidate for certiorari. Even more significantly, taking the 
case up to the Supreme Court raised the stakes considerably. An adverse 
ruling on the merits would ratify EPA’s stance against greenhouse gas 
regulation and perhaps tie the hands of future administrations that might 
wish to use Clean Air Act provisions to set limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions. An adverse ruling on standing—a possibility made more likely by 
 
 40 Richard Blumenthal & Kimberly Massicotte, Seven States Notify EPA of Their Intent to 
Sue Over Global Warming, SUSTAINABLE DEV., ECOSYSTEMS & CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE 
NEWSLETTER (A.B.A., SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES), June 2003, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/climatechange/newsletter/june03/globalwarming. 
 41 A.B.A., SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 144–
45 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). 
 42 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1449 n.15 (2007). 
 43 See INT’L CTR. FOR TECH. ASSESSMENT, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND COLLATERAL RELIEF 
SEEKING THE REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NEW MOTOR VEHICLES UNDER 
SECTION 202 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.icta.org/doc/ 
ghgpet2.pdf. 
 44 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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the recent appointment of John Roberts as Chief Justice, as Roberts had 
made clear that he would be no friend to environmentalists on the issue of 
standing45—likely would have negative reverberations for litigation on 
climate change and perhaps other environmental issues around the country. 
Nevertheless, petitioners went for it and asked the Court to review the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision.46 In the petition for certiorari, we made several 
noteworthy tactical decisions. First, we led with the question addressed by 
Judge Randolph: whether EPA had erred in concluding that it could decline 
to regulate greenhouse gases, even if it had the authority to regulate them, 
based on reasons such as scientific uncertainty and foreign policy 
concerns.47 We thought that Judge Randolph’s statement that EPA had 
discretion as great as that of Congress when it decided whether to enact 
legislation in the first instance48 might catch the eye of the Justices, even if 
they were otherwise uninterested in the general issue of climate change. 
Second, we opened with the legal errors committed by the D.C. Circuit and 
EPA, and closed with the importance of the issue of climate change. Here, 
too, our hope was that even the Justices who might not be inclined to worry 
about climate change might worry about significant legal errors. Ultimately, 
of course, the Court indicated that it had indeed taken up the case because 
of the importance of the issue of climate change,49 and the Justices in dissent 
let it be known that their viewpoints rested in significant part on the 
environmental backdrop of the case.50 Thus, while we succeeded in 
persuading the Court to take up the case, we failed miserably in our effort to 
disguise this breakthrough case about climate change as an ordinary 
administrative and statutory matter. No one, apparently, was fooled. 
Playing nicely with others. The twenty-nine petitioners in the Supreme 
Court included twelve states, three cities, an American territory, and thirteen 
environmental and public health organizations.51 The number of lawyers 
was, of course, larger than that. In the D.C. Circuit, petitioners had made the 
smart and admirable decision to work together on a single presentation to 
the court, and they continued that practice in the Supreme Court. Thus, this 
large group of diverse entities, represented by skillful lawyers with strong 
opinions, came together and filed one petition for certiorari, one opening 
brief, and one reply brief.52 This way of proceeding meant that we had fewer 
pages to work with than we would have if we had filed separate briefs. We 
had fifty pages for our single opening brief, compared to the 250 pages 
 
 45 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1231 
(1993). 
 46 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (C.A.D.C. 2005) (Nos. 
03-1361 to 03-1368). 
 47 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56–58. 
 48 Id. at 58. 
 49 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007). 
 50 Id. at 1468–71 (Roberts., C.J., dissenting). 
 51 Id. at 1446. 
 52 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 46; Brief for the Petitioners, Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (C.A.D.C. 2005) (Nos. 03-1361 to 03-1368); Reply Brief for the Petitioners, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2006) (No. 05-1120). 
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available to the five different groups of respondents.53 In addition to the 
United States, the respondents were several states led by Michigan, the 
Utility Air Regulatory Group, the CO2 Litigation Group, and the automobile 
manufacturers.54 Each of these groups filed a separate brief.55 The advantage 
of our unified approach was that we presented the Court with one, 
consistent legal theory. Respondents did not. For example, some 
respondents argued that EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases 
was “effectively nonreviewable”;56 others argued that it was reviewable, but 
under a narrow standard.57 One could say, I suppose, that respondents’ 
approach presented a kind of smorgasbord to the Court, from which the 
Court could choose the items it most preferred. My sense, however, is that 
petitioners had the better idea: one work product, one theory. 
Petitioners’ amici also offered a cohesive presentation. Three points are 
of note here. First, several amici—including a group of distinguished climate 
scientists, a group of local governments and local government organizations, 
and an Alaskan organization—participated, with petitioners’ encouragement, 
at the cert stage as well as at the merits stage.58 Amicus support at the cert 
stage has been shown to be an important factor in obtaining review.59 
Second, at the merits stage, individual groups largely suppressed the natural 
desire to file a separate brief, and instead gathered together on joint briefs 
presenting, again, a unified argument. Perhaps most dramatically, seventy-
five different wildlife organizations got together and filed just one brief.60 
Third, the amici were a very diverse lot. They ranged from climate scientists 
to states and local governments to religious organizations to the skiing 
industry and major energy firms.61 Together, they provided what amicus 
briefs, at their best, do: a portrait for the Court of the problem at hand and of 
the consequences of a failure to address that problem. 
Framing the case. In discussing the petition for certiorari, I alluded 
briefly to decisions we faced about how to frame the case for the Court. 
Here I elaborate on those decisions, with reference to the briefs on the 
merits. 
One possibility was to frame the case in terms of the international 
agreements on climate change and, in particular, the agreement signed by 
the United States, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
 
 53 SUP. CT. R. 33.1(g)(v). 
 54 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1446 n.5, 6. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et al. at 43, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
 57 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 39, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 
05-1120). 
 58 See Docket, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (listing amici 
filings), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-1120.htm. 
 59 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interest and Agenda-Setting in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1109 (1988). 
 60 Brief of Amici Curiae Wildlife Conservation Interests in Support of Petitioners at 1, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
 61 See Docket, supra note 58. 
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Change (UNFCCC).62 This convention commits the United States to take 
action to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”63 One might argue that EPA’s failure to address greenhouse gases 
under the Clean Air Act places the U.S. on a collision course with its 
commitments under the UNFCCC. We chose not to place the case in its 
international context in this way. With some Justices hostile to the 
invocation of international law in adjudicating domestic disputes,64 it 
seemed unwise to risk turning them off by relying on international 
agreements that were not at the core of our legal arguments. 
Another possibility was to situate the legal issues explicitly within the 
context of the problem of climate change, and to use the urgency and 
importance of this issue to set the tone for our legal arguments. One might, 
for example, argue that the consequences of climate change for public 
health and welfare are likely to be so dire that any doubt about the Clean Air 
Act’s applicability to climate change should be resolved in favor of action 
rather than inaction. Again, we did not frame the issues in this way. Indeed, 
as I have suggested, we instead framed the case as an ordinary 
administrative and statutory case that happened to arise in an extraordinary 
context. We hoped that Justices who might for whatever reason question the 
significance of the problem of climate change would be persuaded to look 
beyond that pre-existing mindset and consider the legal issues without 
prejudice. In the case of the four dissenting Justices, our hope proved 
forlorn. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts went so far as to express skepticism 
about our unrebutted affidavits on the consequences of climate change for 
Massachusetts and on the effect of U.S. regulation on climate change 
mitigation.65 So much for our attempt to lift the case out of its political 
context. 
A final decision about framing had to do with the kind of relief we 
requested. We did not ask the Court to hold that EPA must find that climate 
change is endangering public health and welfare (it seems to me that the 
United States Supreme Court is the last institution in America that should be 
deciding this issue), and we did not ask the Court to hold that EPA must 
regulate greenhouse gases. Instead, we asked the Court to hold only that 
EPA had legally erred in declining to regulate greenhouse gases, and to 
remand the case to the agency for a decision based on the correct legal 
standard.66 While the case was pending, many commentators and news 
outlets got this point wrong. Even The New York Times seemed under the 
impression that the case might call upon the Court to pronounce upon the 
science of climate change.67 That was not our position. Our position was 
more modest: we simply wanted EPA to follow the correct legal standard in 
 
 62 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
 63 Id. art. 2. 
 64 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1467, 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 66 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 3. 
 67 Editorial, Global Warming and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006. 
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coming to a decision on the now-almost-a-decade-old ICTA petition asking 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. 
Arguing the merits. In arguing the questions regarding EPA’s authority 
and discretion under the Clean Air Act, we made a tactical decision to rely 
almost exclusively on the text of the statute. Our thinking was as follows: 
First, most simply, the text of the statute clearly pointed in our direction. 
Section 202 directs EPA to regulate “air pollutants” from new motor vehicles 
when they cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.68 The Clean Air Act defines 
“air pollutants” to mean “any air pollution agent or combination of such 
agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . 
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient 
air.”69 All of the greenhouse gases petitioners had asked EPA to regulate—
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, and hydrofluorocarbons—are 
physical and chemical substances or matter which are emitted into or 
otherwise enter the ambient air.70 Moreover, we argued, the use of the word 
“including” meant that the category of “air pollution agents” was, if anything, 
broader than the large category of substances or matter emitted into the 
ambient air.71 (A digression here: one evening after I had spent the day 
working on the brief, my then-ten-year-old daughter asked me what exactly I 
had done all day. I told her I had spent the day explaining the meaning of 
“including.” She asked how could it be that “these people”—the Justices—
“who were, like, 60 or 70 years old,” did not know what “including” meant. I 
asked her if she knew, asking her if one said “A includes B,” which was 
bigger, A or B? She quickly answered “A.” I said she got it right, but that EPA 
had gotten this point wrong. She was incredulous. She was even more 
incredulous when, later, she learned that Justice Scalia had gotten it wrong, 
too.72). 
Our arguments from the statutory text were more extensive than I have 
explained here,73 but our basic conviction, and argument to the Court, was 
that the statutory text compelled a conclusion that EPA had the authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases and that its reasons for saying it could decline to 
regulate even if it had the authority to do so flouted the statutory language. 
Another reason for our decision to rely almost entirely on the text of the 
statute was that this is the kind of argument that has found favor with even the 
Justices who might not be inclined to rule in our favor. Specifically, I was 
utterly convinced that we simply had Justice Scalia on at least the authority 
question. Justice Scalia, of course, is perhaps the Court’s most adamant  
 
 
 68 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
 69 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 13–14. 
 72 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1475–76 (2007). 
 73 For a detailed discussion of our arguments, see Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change and the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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textualist.74 And here was an argument based solely on the text of the statute. 
Turns out I was wrong about Justice Scalia. 
To my mind, the trickiest part of briefing the merits of this case was in 
explaining to the Court why EPA had erred in saying that it had discretion to 
decline to regulate even if it had authority to regulate. Courts typically give 
agencies a good deal of leeway when they decline to take action.75 The way 
we approached the question was to look at each reason EPA gave for 
asserting that it had discretion, and to explain why each of them was 
unlawful. Three of the reasons were unlawful for the same reason. EPA’s 
evident distaste for the mandatory controls imposed by section 202, its 
reference to foreign policy concerns, and its worries about the availability of 
technology all failed, legally speaking, because they were simply not factors 
Congress had made relevant to the decision whether to regulate under 
section 202.76 Only endangerment was relevant.77 In this way, we swept away 
three out of four of the reasons EPA had given. 
The fourth was trickier to handle. EPA had said that the science was so 
uncertain that the agency was justified in withholding regulation.78 With a 
statutory trigger like “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare,” scientific uncertainty obviously is a relevant concern.79 
Thus our argument on this point had to be different from the argument 
regarding the other reasons cited by EPA. We could not say that scientific 
uncertainty was totally out of the statutory bounds. Instead, we said that, 
although this factor was relevant, EPA had mishandled it. Section 202 not 
only allows, but requires, regulatory action even in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.80 Thus, simply referring to scientific uncertainty, without saying 
how that uncertainty relates to the statutory standard of reasonable 
anticipation of endangerment, is insufficient.81 The Court accepted this 
argument.82 Here, too, though, Justice Scalia and three of his colleagues 
were unmoved by our appeals to the text of the statute.83 
In making a quite strict textualist argument like this one, one important 
issue that arises is whether one is prepared to accept the natural 
implications of the broad argument. If one cannot take the argument to its 
logical conclusion, one might be faced with charges of inconsistency or 
opportunism. Two implications, in particular, were important to think 
through in this case. First, were we really prepared to say that any substance 
or matter emitted into the ambient air was an “air pollutant”? This would 
 
 74 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 226 (2000) (adding Justice Thomas as equally committed to textualism). 
 75 See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
 76 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 39–40. 
 77 Id. at 39. 
 78 Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 57, at 35. 
 79 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 41. 
 80 Id. at 41–42. 
 81 Id. at 42. 
 82 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
 83 Id. at 1474. 
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mean that water vapor, for example, was an “air pollutant.” We decided that 
we were prepared to accept this implication. Before it would be regulated, 
water vapor would have to be shown to endanger public health or welfare 
and it would have to be emitted by a regulated source.84 With those 
qualifications in mind, the idea that water vapor could be regulated under 
the statute did not seem implausible. Second, we had to decide what to say 
about the implications of our argument for the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS), which are health- and welfare-based standards 
applicable to air quality throughout the country.85 If we were right, and if 
EPA ultimately made a finding of endangerment regarding greenhouse gases, 
was EPA then required to set a NAAQS for greenhouse gases? The 
awkwardness of this possibility came from the fact that no state could come 
into compliance with a NAAQS for, say, carbon dioxide, without not only 
compliant behavior on the part of other states but also without mitigating 
actions on the part of other nations. And we could not say that no one would 
consider petitioning EPA to set a NAAQS for greenhouse gases because 
Massachusetts had, in fact, done just that.86 Instead, we first reminded the 
Court that the NAAQS program was not at issue here; only the cars program 
of section 202 was.87 And, second, we pointed the Court to a bit of language 
in the statute that might allow EPA more room to decline to set a NAAQS 
than we thought it had to decline to set a standard for cars.88 In the end, the 
Supreme Court did not even mention the NAAQS. 
Juggling other cases. Other tactical choices in the case had to do with 
the fact that there were cases all over the country relating to climate change, 
many of them brought by the same parties who were petitioners in this case. 
This case was made more complicated by our desire to protect the litigating 
positions in those cases without jeopardizing our position in this case. For 
example, at the same time Massachusetts v. EPA was pending, the Supreme 
Court was considering Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp. (Duke 
Power).89 One part of that very complicated case involved the question of 
whether the same term used in different parts of a statute must be given the 
same meaning throughout the statute.90 The answer Environmental Defense 
(also one of our petitioners) gave in Duke Power was “no”; an “increase in 
emissions” could mean an hourly increase in one part of the Clean Air Act 
and an annual increase in another.91 In Massachusetts v. EPA, on the other 
 
 84 These prerequisites to regulation are pervasive in the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7411(b)(1)(A) (2001) (new source performance standards are applicable to categories of 
stationary sources that may reasonably be anticipated to endangered public health or welfare). 
 85 Alaska Dep’t Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469–70 (2004). 
 86 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449–51. 
 87 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
 88 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2000) (requiring Administrator to list, as criteria pollutants subject 
to the NAAQS program, pollutants “for which he plans to issue air quality criteria under this 
section”). 
 89 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007). 
 90 Id. at 1432–34. 
 91 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 45–46, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. 
Ct. 1423 (2006) (No. 05-848). 
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hand, there was some potential ground to be gained from arguing that the 
same terms must be deemed to have the same meaning in different parts of 
the statute.92 But nothing would be lost by putting the point less 
dramatically. In this way, we could preserve an argument important to Duke 
Power without sacrificing any argument of importance to Massachusetts v. 
EPA. 
Another example of pending litigation that we had very much in mind in 
briefing Massachusetts v. EPA was the litigation over California’s program 
for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from cars.93 The Clean Air Act gives 
California alone the power to set its own emission standards for 
automobiles,94 yet it also gives other states the authority to adopt 
California’s standards as their own.95 In 2004, California promulgated rules 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.96 By the time the 
Court granted review in Massachusetts v. EPA, ten other states had adopted 
California’s standards,97 and automobile manufacturers had filed lawsuits 
challenging the standards in California, Vermont, and Rhode Island.98 
California and several of the states that had adopted California’s standards 
were petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA.99 Thus, at the same time they 
were hoping for victory in that case, they also had a close eye on the 
litigation over state standards pending in the district courts. One of the 
arguments common to both Massachusetts v. EPA and the litigation over 
state standards was based on the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(EPCA), which sets federal fuel economy standards for cars.100 In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA and other respondents argued that the Clean Air 
Act could not be interpreted to give EPA authority to regulate carbon 
dioxide because reducing carbon dioxide from motor vehicles would largely 
mean increasing vehicles’ fuel economy—thus displacing, EPA and the other 
respondents thought, the scheme created by EPCA.101 In the litigation over 
state standards, the auto manufacturers have argued that state standards are 
preempted by EPCA, both expressly and because of the inherent conflict 
between state emission controls for greenhouse gases and federal fuel 
economy standards.102 In developing our arguments in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, we were cognizant of the fact that the outcome in that case would 
likely have large implications for the litigation over California’s standards. 
Indeed, while Massachusetts v. EPA was under review, the district judge 
hearing the California case stayed that litigation based expressly on the 
 
 92 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 33–35. 
 93 See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 94 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000). 
 95 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000). 
 96 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 1961, 1961.1 (2006). 
 97 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 6. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007). 
 100 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,901–32,919 (2000). 
 101 Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 57, at 24–25. 
 102 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302 (D. 
Vt. 2007). 
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pendency of Massachusetts v. EPA.103 In Massachusetts v. EPA, we tried to 
show that the Clean Air Act and EPCA could live comfortably together, that 
they were written with attention to each other, and that there was no 
inherent conflict between the two laws.104 These arguments were perfectly 
consistent with arguments important to the litigation over state standards, 
but the stakes in making them were made that much higher by the overlap 
between the two pieces of litigation. The outcome in this regard was even 
better than we might have hoped: a brief, dismissive paragraph from the 
Supreme Court saying that the two statutes fit fine together and that the 
existence of EPCA gave EPA no excuse to “shirk its environmental 
responsibilities.”105 Massachusetts v. EPA figured prominently in the 
Vermont district court’s recent decision upholding Vermont’s standards for 
greenhouse gases from automobiles.106 
Standing for something. We knew standing was going to be an issue 
from the beginning. In its opposition to the petition for certiorari, the federal 
government actually added standing as a third question of the case.107 
Notably, the Court declined to add the question of standing to the questions 
to be addressed. Yet, during Chief Justice Roberts’ brief tenure, the Court 
has already proved itself quite willing to add questions—including questions 
regarding standing—to the questions presented by the parties.108 And four 
Justices ended up dissenting on the issue, finding no standing in this case.109 
It continues to baffle me why the four Justices who dissented on standing—
and whose views appeared adamant enough that one might reasonably 
speculate that they thought standing was a live issue in the case from the 
beginning—did not care to add standing to the questions presented and thus 
to receive orderly briefing on the issue.110 Of course, standing is an issue that 
can be raised at any time,111 but this does not mean it is an issue that does 
not deserve the kind of process afforded to other legal issues before the 
Court. 
Given that we knew that the federal government and other respondents 
would raise the issue of standing but that we were also in a posture where 
standing was not formally one of the questions presented in the case, we 
faced the decision of whether to address this issue in our opening brief. The 
advantages of doing so were that we had more pages to work with in the 
opening brief and that by addressing the issue up front we could be the first 
to frame it for the Court. The disadvantages were that we might appear, 
unnecessarily, defensive if we addressed an issue on which we had not lost 
below and that we would not have the benefit of respondents’ briefing on the 
 
 103 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO, 2007 WL 135688 
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007). 
 104 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 30. 
 105 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007). 
 106 Green Mountain, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 307–10. 
 107 Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 57, at I. 
 108 Wilkins v. Cuno, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005). 
 109 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463–74. 
 110 Id. at 1471. 
 111 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
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issue before deciding what arguments to make. Thus, we made only the 
smallest of gestures toward standing in our opening brief, noting the 
presence of twelve states among the petitioners and referring to amicus 
briefs discussing standing.112 Then we waited to see what respondents would 
have to say. If we had not followed this course, I think we might have made 
some foolish mistakes. 
Let me give two examples. The first involves a fellow named Frank 
Keim. Frank Keim was one of our forty-three affiants on standing.113 He 
averred that he lives in Alaska, that he hikes on glaciers, and that his 
enjoyment of hiking has been impaired by the effect of climate change on 
glaciers.114 (The glaciers are melting).115 There is nothing wrong with Mr. 
Keim’s affidavit. In fact, of all the affidavits in the case, this one most closely 
tracked the teachings of the Supreme Court’s decision in Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw, which found standing for plaintiffs who were no longer 
able to enjoy recreational opportunities along a river because the river was 
polluted.116 So, technically speaking, there was nothing wrong and 
everything right about Frank Keim’s affidavit. But if one put Frank Keim out 
there as one’s only evidence of standing, one would just be hosed in the 
Supreme Court—especially in a case in which one is asking the Court to rule 
for the first time on an issue as important as climate change. I don’t care 
what the law is; you lose if you do that. In the end, therefore, we mentioned 
Frank Keim’s plight as one example of the kinds of injuries set forth in our 
affidavits, but we did not dwell on it. Instead, as Judge Tatel had done 
below,117 we focused on Massachusetts’ injury and, in particular, on the 
state’s loss of coastline, noting that states had been coming to the Supreme 
Court to complain about loss of territory since the very founding of the 
republic.118 
Another mistake we might have made would have been to focus on an 
affidavit stating that, historically speaking, when the United States adopts 
technological standards for cars, the developing countries have followed 
suit, and that they could be expected to do so in this context as well.119 The 
significance of this affidavit was that it showed that the stakes in the case 
were not limited to domestic emissions of greenhouse gases, but that they 
extended as well to other countries’ decisions on emission-reducing 
technologies. This would have helped us to establish causation and 
redressability in the standing context, by demonstrating that U.S. decisions 
on motor vehicle standards have large ripple effects. After seeing the federal 
 
 112 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 5–6 & n.5. 
 113 Petitioners’ Standing Appendix at 188–91, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Nos. 03–1361 to 03–1368) (Declaration of Frank Keim). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 190. 
 116 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 117 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 65–67 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 118 See Reply at 9, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2006) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 
3367871. 
 119 Petitioners’ Standing Appendix, supra note 113, at 204–21. (Declaration of Michael C. 
MacCracken). 
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government’s brief, however, which ripped into the idea that standing could 
be based on third-party decisions, we chose not to focus on this affidavit in 
our presentation on standing.120 Again, as a technical legal matter, there was 
nothing wrong with the affidavit. The causal chain it described was neither 
long nor fanciful, and the assertions in the affidavit were unrebutted.121 But 
asking the Court to accept the causal chain the affidavit laid out felt like it 
would be asking more than the Court would embrace. 
We decided, instead, to focus on domestic emissions. We pointed out to 
the Court that twenty-three percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions come 
from motor vehicles, that six percent of the global emissions of carbon 
dioxide come from U.S. cars, and that all told, U.S. cars belch about half a 
billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere every year.122 
Moreover, EPA used the same legal reasoning to reject regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants as it used to reject regulation 
of cars. Together, cars and power plants emit sixty percent of the carbon 
dioxide inventory in this country.123 Despite the Solicitor General’s 
arguments to the contrary, we observed to the Court, these amounts were 
nothing to sneeze at.124 Moreover, we argued, the Clean Air Act itself 
provides that EPA must regulate harmful air pollutants when they “cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”125 We urged the Court not to override that 
statutory directive in the guise of deciding the standing question or, in other 
words, to decide that some specific percentage contribution was required 
for standing purposes even though it was not required by the relevant 
statute.126 It would be activist, we thought and we argued, to use the 
purportedly judicially modest doctrine of standing to undo a statutory 
directive on causation.127 
In short, our argument on standing was quite conventional. We claimed 
an injury, based on unrebutted factual evidence, that has supported Supreme 
Court jurisdiction since the days of the framers.128 We urged the Court to 
find causation and redressability both in the sheer magnitude of the 
emissions involved and in the statutory standard at issue in the case.129 We 
asked for no new law on standing, and indeed affirmatively implored the 
Court not to derange the law of standing in the way respondents’ briefs 
would have done (as by, for example, requiring an unelaborated “meaningful 
contribution” to a problem in order to satisfy the causation requirement).130 
 
 
 120 Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 57, at 7–8, 14–19. 
 121 See id. at 14–15 (citing the MacCracken declaration without challenging its assertions). 
 122 See Reply, supra note 118, at 5, 9. 
 123 Id. at 5. 
 124 Id. at 10. 
 125 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
 126 Reply, supra note 118, at 9. 
 127 Id. at 5. 
 128 Id. at 2. 
 129 Id. at 10–12. 
 130 Id. at 1. 
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The Court met us halfway. In its actual analysis of the standing 
question, it did not purport to break any new legal ground, and upheld our 
standing based on a conventional examination of injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability.131 But the Court prefaced its discussion of these elements 
of standing by noting the importance of state involvement in the case and 
acknowledging the “special solicitude” to be afforded to states when they 
come to federal court to complain about the federal government’s failure to 
protect them from pollution.132 A large question that remains after 
Massachusetts v. EPA is whether private litigants can use the decision to 
support standing in climate change cases.133 
A primary authority cited by the Court in finding “special solicitude” for 
states appropriate is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.134 As Chief Justice 
Roberts noted in his dissent, no brief even mentioned this case.135 Justice 
Kennedy first brought it up at oral argument.136 It remains a mystery how 
this decision emerged as a player in this case. One bemusing anecdote from 
the development of petitioners’ arguments: early on in the briefing, I had 
considered citing this case in support of standing for the states, only to be 
brushed back upon finding the Court’s decision in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel., Barez,137 which appeared to me to hold that the 
standing of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper—“parens patriae” standing138—did 
not apply when states sued the federal government.139 Silly me. 
Coming to terms. The last category of choices is the least substantive 
but may be among the most interesting. Those choices have to do with 
language: what terms do you use for recurring concepts, what literary 
allusions are within bounds, what language is acceptable. On recurring 
concepts, we had to decide, for example, whether to call the problem at 
issue “global warming” or “climate change.” There is no right answer. It 
seemed to me, however, that “climate change” might seem less inflammatory 
to Justices hostile to the very notion of human-induced warming. Similarly, 
rather than referring to “greenhouse gases,” we used the term “air pollutants 
associated with climate change,” which in addition to its slightly euphemistic 
quality had a kind of question-begging virtue to it. Likewise, we did not refer 
to “the Bush Administration” or “the Bush EPA” or anything of that sort; we 
simply referred to EPA. All of these choices were aimed at preventing a  
 
 
 131 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455–58 (2007). 
 132 Id. at 1454–55. 
 133 Notably, the D.C. Circuit has preliminarily—and without analysis—answered “no.” Public 
Citizen v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that states receive ‘special solicitude’ in 
standing analysis, including analysis of imminence. No state is involved in this case, however.”). 
 134 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 135 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 136 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1120.pdf. 
 137 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
 138 Id. at 603–05. 
 139 Id. at 610 n.16. 
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backlash against us from Justices who might not be disposed to accept our 
arguments. Four of those Justices voted against us in any event. 
What literary figures could we use? We opened our analysis in the 
petition for certiorari with Bartleby the Scrivener and closed the opening 
brief on the merits with Cardinal Richelieu. In the petition, we likened EPA’s 
explanation of its decision not to regulate greenhouse gases to Bartleby’s 
famous answer: “I would prefer not to.”140 In the opening brief, we 
analogized the D.C. Circuit’s open-ended approval of EPA’s reasoning to 
Richelieu’s carte blanche: “It is by my order and for the good of the State 
that the bearer of this has done what he has done.”141 Humpty Dumpty also 
made an appearance, in an allusion to his assertion of arbitrary control over 
the words he chose to use.142 I am not suggesting that Bartleby, Richelieu, or 
the big egg made a difference to the outcome of the case. I would wager, 
however, that they made the briefs more enjoyable to read. 
Last, we had to make choices about the actual words we would use to 
make our arguments. In the many long conference calls devoted to line-by-
line discussions of the drafts of the briefs, no topic consumed more attention 
than word choice. No interesting word was liked by everyone; or, to put it 
another way, at least one person disliked—“hated,” sometimes—every word 
with any lilt or kick or whimsy to it. “Farraginous,” “mélange,” “hodgepodge,” 
and many others were criticized for being too unusual or too trite, too 
erudite or too colloquial. “Farraginous,” in particular, came under sustained 
attack. The complaint was that people had had to look it up in a dictionary. 
My response was that if there was one word in the brief that law clerks had 
to look up, that wasn’t necessarily a bad thing; perhaps they would think, 
here is a person who knows something I didn’t know—what else does she 
know that I don’t know? Here again, petitioners ultimately came together 
and agreed to set aside individual differences in order to preserve a brief 
with not only substance, but some style. The lesson may be a good one for 
lawyers and law students alike, who might gather from evidence around 
them that legal writing must be boring to be acceptable. It needn’t be. 
And sometimes writing assistance can come from unexpected sources. 
In one conference call, one person objected to a phrase I had used in 
describing EPA’s decision. There were about fifteen lawyers on the call; no 
one offered a substitute word. I finally suggested “fumbled.” Everyone 
thought that was fine. The next morning at breakfast, however, I worried 
aloud to my family that perhaps one could not just “fumble”; one had to 
fumble something—a ball, a case, etc. My son—then seven years old—said 
simply, “How about ‘blundered’?” So “blundered” it was. 
 
 140 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 46, at 12, 48; HERMAN MELVILLE, Piazza Tales, in 
BARTLEBY 16, 24–25 (1948). 
 141 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 48; ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS 
178 (1888). 
 142 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 52, at 33. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
I have tried to provide a fairly detailed picture of the lawyer’s choices 
that defined and shaped the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation in the Supreme 
Court. Some of these choices probably made a difference to the outcome in 
the case; undoubtedly some did not. It is also possible that, despite our 
victory, in some instances even the Justices in the majority thought we had 
fumbled—or even blundered. But, I must say, it is much less painful to 
second guess one’s litigating choices after a victory than after a defeat. 
 
